WKPP Diving Incident - Analysis

  • Hallo,
    nun nochmal hier,
    wahrscheinlich zum ersten Mal auf einer deutschen Liste.


    mit ausdrücklicher Unterstützung des Authors diesen Vorgang als Crosspost zu verbreiten,
    in bester Absicht, nichts zu vertuschen und das mögliche Zusammenspiel kleinerer Versäumnisse zur adhoc lebensbedrohlichen Situation noch einmal zu verdeutlichen.



    Besten Gruss,
    Hoffi



    _____________________________________________



    MAIL VOM 02.04.2007:




    WKPP Team


    Our plans to explore west and restock/reposition safety tanks in Wakulla
    Springs were postponed yesterday due to an unexpected incident involving the
    primary setup team of Mark Garland and John Rose. We are in the process of
    completing a complete review of the incident and will communicate the
    upcoming schedule as soon as possible. A complete review will involve
    assessing the current procedures, including incident response; I am working
    with our project engineer, training director and project coordinators to
    consider changes to our procedures and response plan where deemed necessary.


    In summary:
    At approximately 7:45am on Saturday morning the primary setup team of Mark
    Garland and John Rose departed for the cave entrance. The team descended on
    rebreather while on 190 gas with a moderate payload of equipment. John Rose
    led the way toward the ledge at 25ft; from this ledge the water drops
    directly to 130ft. Approximately one minute after departure and before
    reaching the ledge Mark Garland lost consciousness. John immediately noticed
    the problem and quickly grabbed Mark, bringing him to the surface. Mark was
    transported to nearby support personnel. Mark was quickly extracted from
    his equipment and moved to the beach area. Support personnel confirmed he
    was breathing and had a strong pulse; he was immediately placed on oxygen
    with Wakulla County EMT arriving several minutes later. Mark was quickly
    transported to Tallahassee Memorial, stabilized and then transported to
    Tallahassee Community in case it was determined chamber treatment was
    necessary. During this time WKPP support personnel were coordinating with
    EMS, DAN and Gene Hobbs at Duke University; these procedures have been
    designed to minimize delay of appropriate treatment. Mark has made an
    excellent recovery; he is alert and responsive and has quickly regained a
    good sense of humor.


    After completing a more comprehensive accident analysis we will communicate
    our findings to the community. Preliminary review confirms correct gas
    content labeling and all equipment appears to be configured correctly; we
    will conduct a careful review to ensure the equipment is functioning
    correctly. John Rose has noted current environmental conditions (low water
    and high plant growth) force departing teams to stay high and scooter
    farther to the reach deep water. However, given the short time involved we
    remain suspicious about the cause of this accident. WKPP rebreather divers
    have been using this route and procedure for more than ten years. Therefore,
    extensive review is needed before speculation about the cause of the
    incident can be considered productive. Per normal team procedures all
    questions or inquiries should be directed to me and team members should
    refrain from public comments and speculation.


    Having been involved with the WKPP for almost 13 years, I recognize the
    nature of our diving involves a great deal of complexity; ultimately this
    complexity translates to additional risk. Over the years we have been very
    successful managing this risk and we take any sort of injury very
    personally. How we prepare and ultimately respond will make the difference
    between success and failure. I am proud of each team member on site; you
    each executed your responsibilities flawlessly and the emergency plan worked
    as designed. Also, a special thanks to Gene Hobbs who was in the loop within
    minutes, coordinating between DAN and the Tallahassee medical teams. We are
    also grateful to the Tallahassee medical teams for their outstanding
    attention to detail. As additional details become available I will
    communicate to the team list.


    Best,


    Casey McKinlay
    Project Director
    Woodville Karst Plain Project



    ____________________________________




    MAIL VOM 12.04.2007:




    WKPP Diving Incident - Analysis


    Senior WKPP team members have completed a thorough analysis of the March 31
    incident. Our assessment carefully reviewed all relevant WKPP procedures as
    well several noteworthy areas including: the spring environment, diving
    equipment, breathing gasses and EMS response. The investigation also
    conferred with State Park officials regarding future procedures and local
    support.


    The WKPP has managed an impressive safety record while pursuing some of the
    most complex dives ever organized; yet, we recognize that changes in
    technology, team composition and general dive complexity require a regular
    willingness to adjust our procedures where a better approach can be safer
    and/or more effective.


    The WKPP internal analysis did not uncover a single unique cause of the
    March 31 incident; instead a combination of events appears to have initiated
    this shallow water, hypoxic event, occurring as one of our rebreather divers
    began a descent from the surface.


    Report Summary


    Environment
    Our findings indicate excessive plant and hydrilla growth complicated a
    normally easy descent to depth. In this case, the existing path did not
    allow for a clear approach from the surface to the spring basin. A hydrilla
    treatment the week prior to the dive was beginning to take effect on the
    invasive plant. This caused the plant to dye off, allowing it to clump in
    large bunches around the spring basin; this also occurred within the normal
    ingress/egress area for divers. This debris required divers to take a
    shallower, indirect approach to the spring basin; this ultimately delayed a
    more direct descent to deeper water.


    Equipment
    Gas Venting/Addition
    The RB80 was functioning properly; however, it was discovered that the diver
    had incorrectly installed the aluminum bellows addition plate upside down
    and without the inner bellows o-ring. This scenario allows a small volume
    of gas to pass between the inner and outer bellows, affecting the portion of
    gas vented to the ambient water. Ultimately this can cause a faster
    reduction in one's PO2. The equipment configuration mentioned did hold a
    vacuum in pre-dive testing but ultimately contributed to less than complete
    venting of the loop. While at depth the PO2 drop seems negligible. However,
    it is obvious that divers must use greater care in ensuring proper assembly
    and function.


    Addition Regulators
    Both gas addition valves were in need of servicing; this limited the
    efficiency of the addition regulators. The diver confirms manually
    adjusting the second stage orifices pre-dive to reduce a developing
    free-flow; this ultimately reduced the ease with which fresh gas flowed to
    the counterlung. Again, this problem creates a noticeable but not
    problematic O2 drop when working with greater total oxygen concentrations.


    Operation
    The rebreather and open circuit system were functioning properly and
    configured correctly. The diver's 190 descent gas was correctly plugged into
    the switchblock; the backgas was not plugged into the switchblock per normal
    procedures; the unit was vented following pre-dive assembly, the inner and
    outer bellows were not damaged in any way and the OPV was functioning
    correctly.


    Breathing Gas
    The diver correctly plugged in 190 decompression gas for descent from
    surface; he was following descent venting procedures. Post-dive gas analysis
    confirmed 17% oxygen and 49% helium in the mix. WKPP procedures call for a
    maximum 21% oxygen content within the 190 decompression gas. While 17%
    oxygen is slightly lower than the ideal mix, this alone should not have been
    a problem.


    Support and Response
    Surface support responded swiftly once the diver was brought to the surface.
    The diver's partner is credited with an impressive response, emphasizing the
    importance of operating as a team. The WKPP believes this to be the single
    most critical factor in all diving operations, including successful
    resolution of this incident.


    WKPP Procedural Changes


    Environment
    Pre-dive clearing of ingress/egress area to allow for a clear path to the
    spring basin and cave entrance. Park officials have agreed to assist as
    necessary.


    Equipment
    RB80 assembly - complete team overview of assembly procedures for RB80 units
    with emphasis on critical components.


    RB80 maintenance - emphasis on encouraging RB80 owners worldwide to schedule
    yearly or as needed maintenance through local dealers or Halcyon Mfg.


    Breathing Gas
    Clarify difference between 190 decompression gas and 190 support gas; 21/35
    is our decompression and transition gas while support and diving gasses are
    our standard 18/45.


    Change rebreather descent procedures to require open circuit descent while
    using 190 decompression gas (21/35) to a depth of 50ft at which point the
    diver can switch to rebreather and stow second stage regulator on drive
    bottle.


    Support and Response
    Add open circuit escort team for rebreather divers descending from the
    surface to 50ft. The open circuit team will escort each rebreather team and
    assist as necessary during the descent to the cave entrance. The team will
    remain in the water until the first team returns from its planned mission
    and normal decompression support operations begin.



    Add two support team members for shallow water surface support to assist
    divers as they enter the water and prepare to depart for missions within the
    cave system. Both divers will have mask/fins available to assist with any
    shallow water support needs.



    Add support team member to dive tower at Wakulla Springs to monitor teams as
    they depart the beach area towards the spring basin and cave entrance.




    Summary
    The WKPP believes the following changes and improvements will further
    enhance our ability to safely and effectively manage exploration and
    research support within the cave systems of the Woodville Karst Plain. We
    recognize that we cannot plan for every eventuality and much of what we do
    has no blueprint to follow; however, we can and will adjust policies to
    reflect the safest possible procedures. I believe each and every team member
    makes safety, awareness, buddy skills and attention to detail a priority and
    I expect the entire team to take it to the next level this 2007 season. I
    look forward to seeing everyone later this month as we resume operations on
    April 21-22.




    I would like to thank those that have reached out this past week and offered
    assistance and expressed support for the team. I would also like to point
    out that this information should not be considered confidential and will
    benefit divers, project leaders and rebreather users worldwide. The WKPP
    has contributed a great deal over the years to technical diving, team diving
    and project planning and logistics and we will continue to do so going
    forward.




    Casey McKinlay


    Project Director


    Woodville Karst Plain Project

  • Hallo Hoffi,


    danke für diesen Bericht. Auch wenn Tauchunfallberichte grundsätzlich hier im Board abgelehnt werden möchte ich diesen hier stehen lassen, weil er sich meiner Meinung nach grundlegend von anderen Berichten in mehrerlei Hinsicht unterscheidet:


    1 - Der Bericht ist detailliert und anschaulich und läßt kaum Spielraum zur Interpretation
    2 - Die Unfallursache wurde geklärt - wieder werden Spekulationen ausgeschlossen
    3 - Es wurden für das Team die Prozeduren verändert - Lernphase
    4 - Der Taucher ist nicht tödlich verunglückt


    Insofern stellt der Bericht für mich ein Beispiel par excellence dar, wie aus kritischen Situationen immer wieder gelernt werden kann bzw. muss. Dass es sich bei dem "Team" um eine der wohl erfahrensten Höhlentaucher weltweit handelt, macht deutlich wie offensiv man mit solchen Vorfällen umgehen kann und wie man daraus für die Zukunft lernt.


    Lieben Gruss
    MONSTI

  • Zitat

    Original von db8us
    Ich denke es zeigt auch welchen Vorteil ein gute Buddy bringt, naemlich den Unterschied zwischen Leben und Tod.



    !!!


    Zu schade auch, wie die Mehrzahl der werten "Gucci-divers" drüben auf RBW sich wiederholt ins Equipment verbeissen...

  • ...zur Erläuterung,
    denselben Thead gibts auf RBW, dort ergiessen sich nicht wenige in den alten Abwehrreflexen gegenüber DIR ( in einem Unfallthread, hmm... ) und können meist nicht das allzu offensichtliche ( vor sich selbst ) zugeben,


    was Micha kurz und prägnant oben zusammenfasst.


    Zu viele teuer ausgestattete Techtaucher sind ja dann auch meist solo unterwegs,
    mögliche Sensibilisierungen bzgl. Aufmerksamkeit für einen möglichen Tauchpartner gehören zu oft nicht zum Qualifikationsportfolio,
    da das komplexe Lebenserhaltungssystem und die ausführliche Beschäftigung mit der Maschine die Prioritätenliste anführt und vom eigentlich wichtigen zu sehr ablenkt.


    Stattdessen wird ohne Ende auf dem fehlenden O2-Monitoring in pSCR's rumgeritten.
    Für mich und hoffentlich genug andere klingt das leider brutalst nach Thema verfehlt,
    insbesondere wenn mehr Details zu den ausschweifenden Unzulänglichkeiten galvanisch basierter Sensorik bekannt sind...


    Das Wissen fehlt meist und wird zugekleistert mit dem festen Glauben an die Kalibrierung und was sonst noch so an zweifelhaften Bugfixes für ein an sich unzureichend sicheres System ( CCR basierend auf galvanischer O2-sensorik ) umherfleucht.



    ( Dies dann auch unter näherer Betrachtung des Vorfalles in Verbindung mit den Prozeduren und Regeln )


    gruss,
    hoff

  • Hi Hoffi,


    machen wir es doch einfach an der Tatsache fest, dass es viel einfacher ist an der Technik rumzumäkeln und diese vermeintlich zu verbessern, als sich selbst zu hinterfragen bzw. das Equipment "Hirn" zu pimpen.


    So lange ich glaube für ein Problem nur ein besseres/neueres Teil kaufen zu müssen - habe ich vermutlich noch nicht einmal ausreichend über das Problem nachgedacht!


    Dann sind da sicher noch die "Unsterblichen", aber die wirst Du mit Vernunft eh nie bekommen 8)


    MONSTI

  • Servus Martin,


    Gute Ausbildung ist auch auf RBW immer wieder Thema,
    wirkt aber auf mich ein bisserl unwirklich und mehr wie ein Ritual in der Öffentlichkeit.


    Schnell kommt dann auch wieder der Schwenk auf die endlosen Threads zu den Unzulänglichkeiten der Geräte die es zu erkennen, kontrollieren und zu beherrschen gilt.


    Das ist eben noch wahres Heldentum,
    ähnlich dem "unsterblichen" Ruhm der frühen Luftfahrt- oder Rennpioniere.


    Mir erscheint die Formel 1 von heute deutlich sicherer als das bugfix-beladenes eCCR-tauchen.


    Gruss und nach Süden gewunken!
    Hoffi
    :-D

  • Wenn ich jetzt richtig zwischen den Zeilen gelesen habe
    wird jetzt sogar ein Unfall bei den Passivmischern
    als Stimmungsmache gegen CCrs verwendet


    Ich glaub ich bin im falschen Film :pfeif:

    Nichts ist mächtiger als die Anziehungskraft des Abgrunds

  • Zitat

    Original von IN468
    Wenn ich jetzt richtig zwischen den Zeilen gelesen habe
    wird jetzt sogar ein Unfall bei den Passivmischern
    als Stimmungsmache gegen CCrs verwendet


    Ich glaub ich bin im falschen Film :pfeif:



    Genau Tilo,
    so liest dann jeder was er lesen will,
    wie schön.